

Cognitive Illusions

A Handbook on Fallacies and Biases in
Thinking, Judgement and Memory

Edited by
Rüdiger F. Pohl

2004

 **Psychology Press**
Taylor & Francis Group
HOVE AND NEW YORK

17 Associative memory illusions

*Henry L. Roediger III and
David A. Gallo*

Distortions of memory arise from many causes. Several types of memory illusions reviewed in this volume are created from external sources. In recollecting some target event from the past, people will often confuse events that happened before or after the target event with the event itself. (These confusions are examples of proactive and retroactive interference, respectively.) On the other hand, the illusion described in this chapter involves the remembering of events that never actually occurred. This erroneous information is internally created by processes that would otherwise lead to good memory for actual events. As such, these errors are part and parcel of the natural memory process, and they are extremely difficult to avoid. Although most of the research reviewed here involves a tightly controlled laboratory paradigm using word lists, we believe (and will cite evidence to support) the claim that similar processes occur whenever people try to comprehend the world around them – reading a newspaper or novel, watching television, or even perceiving scenes with little verbal encoding at all (Roediger & McDermott, 2000b).

THE ASSOCIATIVE TRADITION

Scholars have always assumed that memory is fundamentally associative in nature. The associative doctrine maintains that mental processes and phenomena can be explained by invisible bonds – associations – that link basic mental representations. Some 2300 years ago Aristotle (384–322 BC) theorized in *De Memoria et Reminiscentia* that “acts of recollection, as they occur in experience, are due to the fact that one movement [that is, one thought] has by nature another that succeeds it in regular order.” Associationism became a more formal theory in the work of the great British associationists Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and David Hartley, among others, in the 17th and 18th centuries. Hobbes wrote of the “trayne of thoughts” and Locke proposed “the association of ideas” as a fundamental mental mechanism, whereas Hartley tried to provide a physiological explanation of associations (see Roediger, McDermott, & Robinson, 1998, for a fuller discussion).

Early experimental psychologists drew on associative ideas for experimental inspiration. Hermann Ebbinghaus's pioneering memory studies, published in his monograph *On Memory* (1885/1913), assumed that memories were retained through associative chains. His methodology (serial anticipation learning) helped to uncover the mechanisms of direct and remote associations. Several years later, Mary Calkins developed the paired-associate learning technique to directly measure the formation of associations. Even pioneers of research on animal learning, such as Edward Thorndike and Ivan Pavlov, assumed that the process was fundamentally associative. There was really no competing theory.

Modern work in human memory has continued this associative tradition. John Anderson published several theories (e.g., Free Recall by Associative Nets and Human Associative Memory; FRAN and HAM, respectively) with an unabashedly associative character in the early 1970s. In the 1980s, Jeroen Raijmakers and Richard Shiffrin proposed the highly influential model SAM – Search of Associative Memory – which also relies heavily on the associative nature of memory (see also SARA in Chapter 20 of this volume), as do all of the connectionist theories (such as those initially proposed by David Rumelhart and James McClelland and colleagues) that are currently in vogue in areas of computational modelling and artificial intelligence.

In all these theories, associations are viewed as a powerful positive force to support remembering – the stronger the associative bond between two elements, the more probable is retrieval of the second element when given the first as a cue. The idea that associative connections might have a dark side – that they may lead to errors of memory – has hardly ever been considered. However, the point of this chapter is that memory distortions can indeed be induced by associative means.

As far as we know, this idea was first suggested, quite offhandedly, in a paper by Kirkpatrick (1894). Kirkpatrick was interested in whether items presented as visual objects were better retained than those presented as words, but his side observations are of interest for present purposes and worth quoting:

About a week previously in experimenting upon mental imagery I had pronounced to the students ten common words . . . it appears that when such words as “spool,” “thimble” and “knife” were pronounced many students at once thought of “thread,” “needle,” and “fork,” which are so frequently associated with them. The result was that many gave those words as belonging to the list. This is an excellent illustration of how things suggested to a person by an experience may be honestly reported by him as part of the experience.

(Kirkpatrick, 1894, p. 608)

The process described by Kirkpatrick is the topic of this chapter, how items associated to presented items are often actually remembered as having been overtly presented (rather than inferred covertly). Underwood (1965) suggested the same idea many years later and showed that if a word such as *table* were presented in a list, participants would be somewhat more likely to falsely recognize an associated word such as *chair* in a later test (than if *table* had not been in the list). Underwood's effect was quite small, however, and the technique presented in the next section produces much more robust effects. Indeed, false recognition can sometimes be more likely than true recognition when elicited by this newer technique. A simplified version of such an experiment that can be used as a classroom demonstration is described in Text box 17.1.

Text box 17.1 Classroom demonstration

This demonstration can be used to create false memories in only a few minutes. For best results, participants should not be told that the demonstration is on false memories until after the experiment.

Material

The material consists of four lists with 15 words each that are all associated to a critical, but not included, target word.

List 1: *bed, rest, awake, tired, dream, wake, snooze, blanket, doze, slumber, snore, nap, peace, yawn, drowsy.*

List 2: *door, glass, pane, shade, ledge, sill, house, open, curtain, frame, view, breeze, sash, screen, shutter.*

List 3: *nurse, sick, lawyer, medicine, health, hospital, dentist, physician, ill, patient, office, stethoscope, surgeon, clinic, cure.*

List 4: *sour, candy, sugar, bitter, good, taste, tooth, nice, honey, soda, chocolate, heart, cake, tart, pie.*

The critical target words are *sleep, window, doctor, and sweet*, respectively.

Procedure

The experimenter tells the participants that this will be a memory demonstration, and that they should have a piece of scrap paper and a pen ready for the memory test. The experimenter then tells them that s/he will read lists of words, and that they should try to remember these words. The participants should not be allowed to write the words down as they are being read. The experimenter then reads the first list, at a steady rate of one word every 1 to 2 seconds. After the final word, the participants are asked to write down as many words as they can remember, in any order, without guessing. Participants usually take less than a minute to recall each list. This procedure is then repeated for the next three lists.

Analysis

After the final list is recalled, the experimenter counts separately for each list the number of participants (by having them raise their hands or by tallying the recall sheets) who recalled the critical word. As these critical associates were never presented, their recall represents false memories.

SAMPLE EXPERIMENT: THE DRM PARADIGM

Roediger and McDermott (1995) adapted a paradigm first used by Deese (1959) for a somewhat different purpose. The paradigm produces a very strong associative memory illusion and (owing to a suggestion by Endel Tulving) is now called the DRM paradigm (for Deese-Roediger-McDermott). The paradigm and variants of it are frequently used as a straightforward technique for gaining measures of both veridical and false memories using both recall and recognition techniques. We describe a somewhat simplified version of Experiment 2 in Roediger and McDermott (1995).

Typical method

A set of 24 associative lists were developed, each list being the 15 strongest associates to a nonstudied word, as found in word association norms. These norms are based on a free association task, in which participants were presented a stimulus word (e.g., *rough*) and told to generate the first word that comes to mind. To create each of our lists, we took the 15 words that had been elicited most often by the stimulus word (e.g., the words *smooth*, *bumpy*, *road*, *tough*, *sandpaper*, *jagged*, *ready*, *coarse*, *uneven*, *riders*, *rugged*, *sand*, *boards*, *ground*, and *gravel*; see Stadler, Roediger, & McDermott, 1999, for a set of 36 lists with normative false recall and recognition data). These study lists were presented to new participants, and their memory was subsequently tested. Critically, the stimulus word (*rough* in this case) was never studied by these participants. Our interest centred on the possible false recall or false recognition of this critical word. If a participant were like a computer or tape recorder, recording and retrieving the words perfectly, one would not expect such systematic memory errors.

A total of 30 undergraduate participants were auditorily presented with 16 of the 24 word lists, one word at a time. Participants recalled half of the lists immediately after their presentation (with 2 minutes provided for recall), and they were instructed not to guess but only to recall the words they were reasonably sure had been in the list. They performed arithmetic problems for 2 minutes after each of the other lists. Shortly after all 16 of the lists had been presented in this way, participants took a *yes/no* recognition test that covered all 24 lists. Because only 16 lists had been studied, items from the other 8 lists served as lures or distractors to which participants

should respond “no” (it was not on the list). The recognition test was composed of 96 words, with 48 having been studied and 48 new words. Importantly, 16 of these new words were the critical missing lures (words like *rough*) that were strongly associated to the studied words.

After each word that they recognized as having been in the list (the ones judged “yes”), participants made a second judgement. They were asked to judge whether they remembered the moment of occurrence of the word in the list – say by being able to remember the word before or after it – what they were thinking when they heard the word, or some other specific detail. This is called a *remember* judgement and is thought to reflect the human ability to mentally travel back in time and re-experience events cognitively. If they were sure the word had been in the list, perhaps because it was highly familiar, but could not remember its specific moment of occurrence, they were told to make a *know* judgement. The remember/know procedure was developed by Endel Tulving in 1985, and has since been used by many researchers in order to measure the phenomenal basis of recognition judgements (see Gardiner & Richardson-Klavehn, 2000, for an overview).

Typical results

Let us consider the immediate free recall results first. Recall of list items followed the typical serial position curve, with marked primacy and recency effects reflecting good recall at the beginning (primacy) and end (recency) of the list. Consider next false recall of the critical nonpresented word such as *rough* (in our sample list used above). Despite the fact that recall occurred immediately after each list and participants were told not to guess, they still recalled the critical nonpresented item 55% of the time. In this experiment, recall of the critical nonpresented item was actually higher than recall of the items that were presented in the middle of the list. In other studies, the probability of recall of critical items often approximates recall of items in the middle of the list, with the particular outcome depending on such factors as presentation rate of the lists (1.5 seconds in this study) and whether the lists are presented auditorily or visually. The important point is that false recall was very high.

The recognition test also revealed a powerful associative memory illusion. The basic data are presented in Figure 17.1. Shown in the two panels are data from the eight lists that were studied and recalled (the right panel) and from the eight lists that were studied but not previously recalled. Within each panel, the left bar shows veridical or true recognition (the hit rate) of items actually studied, whereas the right bar shows false recognition of the critical lures like *rough* (the critical-lure false alarm rate). The false alarm rates to the items from the eight nonstudied lists that appeared on the test are given in the figure caption. Finally, each bar is divided into a dark portion (items called old and judged to be *remembered*) and a white portion (items called old and judged to be *known*).




Figure 17.1 The DRM false-recognition effect (Roediger & McDermott, 1995, Exp. 2). False recognition of critical lures approximated the hit rate for list items. False alarms to list words from nonstudied lists were 0.11, and those to critical words from nonstudied lists were 0.16.

Figure 17.1 shows the very large false recognition effect that is typical of the DRM paradigm. For example, for lists that were studied and had been recalled, participants recognized 79% of the list words as old and said they remembered 57% of the words. Nearly three-quarters of the words called old were judged to be remembered (i.e., $57/79 = 72\%$). Surprisingly, the data for the critical lures (which, again, were not actually presented) were practically the same! Participants recognized 81% as old and even judged 58% remembered; and, just as for studied words, 72% of the words judged old were remembered ($58/81 = 72\%$). So, in the DRM paradigm, the level of false recognition and false remembering is about the same as veridical recognition and remembering of list words. The situation is much the same for the lists that were studied but not recalled, with false recognition of critical lures being as high as (or even higher than) veridical recognition of list words. Note, however, that remember judgements were lower on the recognition test (for both kinds of items) when the lists had not been recalled. In some ways, the data in the left panel show effects of recognition that are “purer” in that they were not contaminated by prior false recall. Nonetheless, striking levels of false recognition and “remember” judgements were obtained.

Discussion

Perhaps because the effect is so robust, a sceptical reaction after learning about the effect is common: Participants are obviously not trying to remember at all. Instead, this reasoning continues, participants are faced with too many words to remember, and so make educated guesses as to which words were presented. In particular, they realize that the lists consist of associated items, so they infer that critical items (which are associated to the study lists) were also presented. Miller and Wolford (1999) formalized this sort of decision process in terms of a liberal criterion shift to any test word that is perceived as related to the study list (i.e., the critical items). This model was primarily directed at false recognition, although a generate/recognize component was included to account for false recall. In either case, it is assumed that participants try to capitalize on the related nature of the lists (via some sort of liberal criterion to related items), in the hopes of facilitating their memory for studied words.

Gallo, Roediger, and McDermott (2001) directly tested this account by informing participants about the illusion and telling them to avoid false recognition of nonstudied but related words. The critical condition was when participants were warned between study of the lists and the recognition test, thereby precluding a liberal guessing strategy for related items. The results were straightforward: Warning participants between study and test had negligible effects on false recognition (relative to a no-warning control condition), even though other conditions revealed that warned participants were trying to avoid false recognition. This pattern is also obtained in false recall (e.g., Neuschatz, Payne, Lampinen, & Toggia, 2001). Gallo et al. (2001) reasoned that warned participants did not adopt a liberal strategy to related items because, after all, they were trying to avoid false alarms to these items. Thus, robust false memory effects following warnings were not due to such strategic decision processes alone, but instead were due to processes that are inherent in the memory system. This conclusion is bolstered by the finding that participants will often claim that these false memories are subjectively detailed and compelling (as reviewed below).

In sum, the DRM paradigm produces very high levels of false recall, false recognition, and false remembering, as great as any memory illusion ever studied. As noted above, similar associatively based errors have been obtained using a wide variety of materials, including pictures, sentences, and stories, although these errors are usually not as frequent as those observed in the DRM paradigm (see Roediger & McDermott, 2000a, 2000b, for an overview). In general, any set of materials that strongly implies the presence of some object or event that is not actually presented lends itself to producing false recall and false recognition of the missing but implied event (cf. Chapter 19 on the misinformation effect). Why, then, are the false memories produced by the DRM paradigm so robust?

There are several answers to this question, but we will concentrate on the

most critical one: the number of associated events that are studied. The DRM paradigm, in contrast to most other memory illusions, relies on the presentation of multiple associates to the critical nonstudied word, thereby taking full advantage of the power of associations. Robinson and Roediger (1997) directly examined the effect of number of associated words on false recall and false recognition. In one experiment, they presented participants with lists of 15 words prior to recall and recognition tests, but the number of words associated to a critical missing word was varied to be 3, 6, 9, 12, or 15. Increasing numbers of associated words steadily increased false recall of the critical nonpresented word, from 3% (with 3 words) to 30% (with 15 words). (A similar increase was found in false recognition.) Thus, even though the total number of words studied was the same in all conditions, the number of studied associates to the critical word had a considerable influence on the strength of this memory illusion. We discuss the theoretical implications of this finding in the next section.

THEORIES AND DATA

In this section we consider the processes that may be involved and how they might interact to give rise to the associative false-recognition effect. This discussion is divided into two main sections: processes that cause the effect and opposing processes that reduce the effect. Our goal is not to exhaustively review all of the DRM findings – that would be well beyond the scope of this chapter. Rather, we highlight the main theoretical issues and discuss those DRM findings that we feel critically inform these issues. In many instances, more than one group of researchers reported relevant findings, but for brevity we cite only one or two findings to illustrate the point.

Processes that cause the effect

The dominant theories of the DRM effect fall into two classes: *association-based* and *similarity-based*. These classes differ in the types of information or representation that is proposed to cause false remembering (and in terms of the processes that allegedly give rise to these representations). Nevertheless, these theories are not mutually exclusive, and evidence suggests that both types of mechanism make a unique contribution to the effect. We discuss each in turn, followed by a brief consideration of attribution processes that may contribute to the subjectively detailed nature of associative false memories.

Association-based theories

According to the association-based theories, a pre-existing representation of the critical nonpresented word becomes activated when its associates are

presented. Thus, presenting *bed, rest, awake* etc. activates the mental representation of the word *sleep*. Under this theory, false remembering occurs when the participant mistakes associative activation with actual presentation, which can be conceptualized as a reality-monitoring error (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993). This theory uses Underwood's (1965) classic idea of the implicit associative response (IAR), and is consistent with Deese's (1959) finding that the degree of association between the list words and the critical nonpresented word (dubbed Backward Associative Strength, or BAS) was highly predictive of false recall. That is, the more items in the list have the critical item as an associate (BAS), the more likely the list is to produce false recollection.

Deese's (1959) finding was recently replicated and extended by Roediger, Watson, McDermott, and Gallo (2001) who reported that BAS predicted most of the variance in false recall (among several candidate variables) using multiple regression analysis. A scatterplot illustrating the relationship between false recall and BAS is presented in Figure 17.2. Roediger et al. (2001) interpreted this relationship as evidence for associative activation. The notion is that associates activate the lexical representation of the critical word, and this activation supports the thought of the item on a recall test. They also found that BAS was related to false recognition, suggesting that activation might be a common cause of false recall and false recognition, although the differences in recognition tend to be somewhat smaller than




Figure 17.2 Scatterplot of the relationship between false recall and backward associative strength across 55 DRM lists. Backward associative strength refers to the tendency of list items to elicit the critical item in free association norms. The dashed line illustrates the strong positive correlation (see Roediger et al., 2001).

those found in recall (see Gallo & Roediger, 2002). The aforementioned list-length effect (e.g., Robinson & Roediger, 1997) is also consistent with an associative activation mechanism: increasing the number of associates studied increases associative activation, and hence increases false recall and recognition.

Two obvious questions concern the form of this activation (conscious or nonconscious?) and when it occurs (study or test?). The fact that false recall and false recognition occur even with very rapid study presentation rates (under 40 ms per item, or less than a second per list) suggests that conscious thoughts of the critical item during study are not necessary to elicit false memory (see McDermott & Watson, 2001, for recall evidence, and Seamon, Luo, & Gallo, 1998, for recognition evidence). This is consistent with semantic priming models, which suggest that associative activation at study can automatically spread from one word node to another (see Roediger, Balota, & Watson, 2001). However, just because conscious thoughts of the critical item may not be necessary to elicit false remembering does not imply that they do not occur at the relatively slower presentation rates (e.g., 1 s per item) that are typically used in the paradigm. At more standard rates, overt rehearsal protocols indicate that participants often think of the critical item during study, and the frequency of these thoughts predicts subsequent false recall (e.g., Goodwin, Meissner, & Ericsson, 2001).

Additional evidence that associative activation occurs at study has been obtained using implicit tests. After presenting participants with several DRM lists, McDermott (1997) found priming for the critical items on several implicit memory tests, and these effects have since been replicated. McDermott (1997) argued that such priming was due to lexical activation of the critical item at study.

Similarity-based theories

Within the second class of theories, it is proposed that DRM false remembering is caused by similarity between the critical item and the studied items, as opposed to associative activation of the critical item. These theories have primarily been used to explain false recognition. For instance, the fuzzy trace theory of memory representations (e.g., Brainerd, Wright, Reyna, & Mojadin, 2001) postulates that studying a list of associates results in the formation of two types of memory traces. Verbatim traces represent detailed, item-specific information, whereas gist traces represent the more general thematic characteristics of the lists. At test, words that are consistent with the gist of the list (such as the critical item) will be highly familiar, and hence falsely remembered. A different similarity-based account was developed by Arndt and Hirshman (1998), as an extension of exemplar-based models of memory. Under their proposal, a separate "gist" representation need not be encoded. Instead, each studied item is encoded as a set of sensory and semantic features. At retrieval, the similarity between the

features of the critical item and the encoded features will make this item familiar, and lead to false remembering.

Despite these differences, both of these similarity-based theories explain DRM false recognition via familiarity caused by semantic similarity, and neither theory appeals to activation of the critical item through associative links. This last point poses important constraints on these theories. Without positing some sort of item-specific activation of the critical item, it is difficult to understand how these theories would explain the generation of this item on a recall test or on perceptually driven implicit memory tests (such as word stem completion).

Perhaps the strongest evidence that similarity-based processes might be involved in addition to associative activation are the effects of retention interval. It has been found that true recall decreases more over a delay than false recall (e.g., Toggia, Neuschatz, & Goodwin, 1999). Illustrative data from Toggia et al. (1999) are presented in Figure 17.3. True recall declined rapidly over a 3-week retention interval, whereas false recall persisted at high levels. Fuzzy trace theory can account for such results because it holds that gist traces are more resistant to forgetting than verbatim traces. As a result, memory for list items (which is supported more by verbatim traces) decreases at a more rapid rate than memory for critical items (which is supported more by gist traces) as retention interval is increased.

Associative-based theories cannot account for such effects without




Figure 17.3 The effects of retention interval on true and false recall (Toggia et al., 1999, Exp. 2). Participants studied five DRM lists, and were given a final free recall test at one of three retention intervals (between-subjects). Data are collapsed across blocked and mixed study presentation, although similar patterns were obtained at each level.

additional assumptions. In the strongest form of these theories, the critical item would be activated multiple times at study and rehearsed like a list item. To the extent that the critical item is encoded like a studied item, the two should have similar forgetting functions (especially when initial levels of true and false remembering were matched). In return, it is unclear how a similarity-based mechanism could account for the powerful relationship between associative strength and false remembering. For example, many of the words in the *whisky* list seem to converge on the meaning of that word (e.g., *drink, drunk, beer, liquor*, etc.) just as words in the *window* list converge on its meaning (e.g., *door, glass, pane, shade*, etc.). Nevertheless, these lists differ greatly in associative strength (0.022 vs 0.184), and in turn, they elicit dramatically different levels of false recall (3% vs 65%; for additional discussion see Gallo & Roediger, 2002; Roediger et al., 2001). In sum, it appears that both associative activation and semantic similarity play a role (cf. the partial-match hypothesis in Chapter 15).

Fluency-based attributions

Although they can explain false recall and false recognition, neither the associative-based account or the similarity-based account can explain the perceptually detailed nature of DRM false memories very well. Roediger and McDermott (1995) found that false recognition of critical items was accompanied with high levels of confidence and frequent *remember* judgments. Both of these findings can be explained by thoughts of the critical item at study, but even this account cannot explain more detailed recollections. For instance, when lists are presented by multiple sources (auditory vs visual, or different voices), participants are often willing to assign a source to critical items that are falsely recognized (Gallo, McDermott, Percer, & Roediger, 2001) or recalled (Hicks & Marsh, 1999). Similarly, using the Memory Characteristics Questionnaire (MCQ), participants often claim to recollect specific details about a critical item's presentation at study, such as perceptual features, list position, and personal reactions to the word (e.g., Mather, Henkel, & Johnson, 1997).

One explanation for these subjective phenomena is a *fluency-based attribution* process. Gallo and Roediger (2003) proposed that, at test, participants imagine having been presented with the critical item at study, perhaps in an effort to determine whether it was presented. This imagination is then mistaken for actual presentation because it is processed more fluently, or more easily, than would have otherwise been expected (cf. Chapter 19 on the misinformation effect). If the attribution process occurs automatically, or nonconsciously, then the phenomenological experience would be one of remembering (see Jacoby, Kelley, & Dywan, 1989). Both the associative-based and similarity-based theories predict that processing of the critical word will be enhanced by presentation of the related list, so that a fluency-based attribution process is consistent with either theory.

Recent data provide some clues that associative activation is involved. As previously discussed, Gallo and Roediger (2002) found that lists with greater BAS were more likely to elicit false recall and false recognition than lists with lower BAS. They also found that false recognition from lists with greater BAS was accompanied by greater confidence and more “remember” judgements than was false recognition from lists with lower BAS. Thus, not only do lists with strong BAS elicit false remembering relatively more often, but when they do, it is more compelling than that from lists with weaker BAS. Using the aforementioned MCQ scale, we also found that critical items from longer lists tended to elicit stronger illusory recollection of various aspects of an item’s presentation, such as its source, perceptual details, and emotional reactions (Gallo & Roediger, 2003). Under the assumption that presenting more associates increases associative activation, this outcome is again consistent with the notion that associative activation can drive illusory recollections.

Processes that reduce the effect

So far we have discussed processes that drive the DRM effect. No theoretical account would be complete, though, without considering editing processes that oppose these forces and reduce false remembering. Such processes have been conceptualized as *reality monitoring* under association-based theories (e.g., activation/monitoring theory), and item-specific or verbatim-based editing in similarity-based theories (e.g., fuzzy trace theory).

Evidence that such additional processes are involved comes primarily from presentation manipulations that should not affect associative activation or semantic similarity, but nevertheless influence false remembering. These include presentation format (e.g., switching presentation from words to pictures, which has been found to reduce false recognition; Schacter, Israel, & Racine, 1999) and presentation modality (e.g., switching presentation from auditory to visual, which reduces both false recall and false recognition; Gallo, McDermott et al., 2001). Other evidence comes from presentation manipulations that should increase similarity or associative processes, but actually decrease false remembering. These include increasing the number of presentations of the study lists before a recognition test (e.g., Benjamin, 2001), and slowing presentation rate (which has been found to eventually reduce false recall, but not necessarily false recognition; Gallo & Roediger, 2002).

To illustrate, consider a presentation-rate study by McDermott and Watson (2001). In those conditions that are relevant here, participants studied DRM lists at a range of visual presentation durations (20, 250, 1000, 3000, and 5000 ms, between-subjects), and took an immediate free recall test after each list. As expected, true recall increased with more study time (0.17, 0.31, 0.42, 0.50, and 0.51). The pattern for false recall was more striking, with an initial increase and an eventual decrease (0.14, 0.31, 0.22,

0.14, and 0.14). The initial increase suggests that, within this range of extremely rapid presentation rates, slowing the duration afforded more meaningful processing and thus enhanced those activation-based or similarity-based processes that drive false recall. In contrast, the eventual decrease suggests that slowing presentation rates also increases item-specific processing of the list items. Apparently, the accrual of this item-specific information eventually reached a point where it began to facilitate monitoring processes that opposed false recall.

Although these data (and others) suggest that monitoring or editing processes influence DRM false remembering, the exact nature of each of these processes is still unclear. One explanation is that making the studied items more memorable or distinctive allows participants to better discriminate (at study or at test) between thoughts of the critical item and actually presented items. In a sense, participants realize that a generated item was not actually presented. Alternatively, it could be that generation (and subsequent editing) of the critical item plays no role. Instead, making studied items more distinctive might allow participants to use a more conservative response criterion, overall, thereby reducing false remembering. Both explanations are possible.

We have discussed how both activation/similarity and editing processes may play a role in creating DRM false memories. Further support for the distinction between these two opposing processes comes from neuropsychological data. Amnesics with varied aetiologies (e.g., Korsakoff's or anoxia) tend to show decreased DRM false recognition relative to age-matched controls (e.g., Schacter, Verfaellie, Anes, & Racine, 1998). Due to their neurological deficits, it is improbable that the decreased effect in these participants was due to enhanced editing relative to their controls. Instead, this decrease implies that damage to medial temporal regions (which were the primary but not the sole areas that were damaged) reduces the likelihood of remembering the associative relations or gist that can cause false remembering, much as damage to these regions has traditionally been found to reduce true recall and recognition.

In contrast to the reduced effect in amnesics, patients with frontal lobe lesions showed enhanced DRM false recognition relative to age-matched controls (e.g., Budson, Sullivan, Mayer, Daffner, Black, & Schacter, 2002). Again, given their neurological deficit, it is unlikely that these patients showed increased false recognition because they were better able to encode the gist of the list, or its associative relations. It is more likely that, because the frontal lobes have traditionally been implicated in source-monitoring processes, the elevated levels of false recognition in this population were due to a breakdown in false-memory editing. Consistent with this logic, false alarms to unrelated lures were also elevated in frontal patients. Considered as a whole, the data from these two populations nicely illustrate the opposing influences of activation/similarity and editing processes in the DRM paradigm.

CONCLUSION

Associative memory illusions arise when information from the external world activates internal representations that may later be confused with the actual external events that sparked the association. As we have emphasized, we believe that this process is a general one with wide implications, because such associative activation is a pervasive fact of cognition. To use Jerome Bruner's famous phrase, people frequently go "beyond the information given" in drawing inferences, making suppositions, and creating possible future scenarios. Although these mental activities make us clever, they can also lead to errors when we confuse what we thought with what actually happened. The DRM paradigm provides a tractable laboratory task that helps open these processes to careful experimental study, and it also provides a rich arena for testing theories of internally generated false memories.

SUMMARY

- People can falsely remember nonpresented events that are associated to events that occurred.
- Research has identified two sets of factors that are critical for the creation of these types of false memories: activation processes and monitoring processes.
- Activation processes, such as the mental generation of associative information, cause people to believe that the nonpresented event had actually occurred. The similarity between nonstudied events and studied events also plays an important role.
- Monitoring processes refer to the strategic editing of these retrieval products, in an effort to reduce false remembering.
- The frequent occurrence of these systematic errors provides important insights into the cognitive mechanisms of memory.

FURTHER READING

For an early investigation of individual differences in susceptibility to false memories in the DRM task, Winograd, Peluso, and Glover (1998) provide a thoughtful analysis. This article is found in a special issue of *Applied Cognitive Psychology* (Vol. 12), devoted solely to the issue of individual differences in false memories. For an overview of neuropsychological findings in the DRM paradigm, and for additional discussion of underlying neural mechanisms, Schacter, Norman and Koutstaal (1998) is a good place to start. Finally, Bruce and Winograd (1998) provide a historical analysis of the DRM task, and give several reasons for its rise in popularity among memory researchers in the past decade.

REFERENCES

- Arndt, J., & Hirshman, E. (1998). True and false recognition in MINERVA2: Explanations from a global matching perspective. *Journal of Memory and Language*, *39*, 371–391.
- Benjamin, A. S. (2001). On the dual effects of repetition on false recognition. *Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition*, *27*, 941–947.
- Brainerd, C. J., Wright, R., Reyna, V. F., & Mojardin, A. H. (2001). Conjoint recognition and phantom recollection. *Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition*, *27*, 307–327.
- Bruce, D., & Winograd, E. (1998). Remembering Deese's 1959 articles: The Zeitgeist, the sociology of science, and false memories. *Psychonomic Bulletin and Review*, *5*, 615–624.
- Budson, A. E., Sullivan, A. L., Mayer, E., Daffner, K. R., Black, P. M., & Schacter, D. L. (2002). Suppression of false recognition in Alzheimer's disease and in patients with frontal lobe lesions. *Brain*, *125*, 2750–2765.
- Deese, J. (1959). On the prediction of occurrence of particular verbal intrusions in immediate recall. *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, *58*, 17–22.
- Ebbinghaus, H. (1885/1913). *On memory: A contribution to experimental psychology*. New York: Dover.
- Gallo, D. A., McDermott, K. B., Percer, J. M., & Roediger, H. L. III (2001). Modality effects in false recall and false recognition. *Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition*, *27*, 339–353.
- Gallo, D. A., & Roediger, H. L. III (2002). Variability among word lists in eliciting memory illusions: Evidence for associative activation and monitoring. *Journal of Memory and Language*, *47*, 469–497.
- Gallo, D. A., & Roediger, H. L. III (2003). The effects of association and aging on illusory recollection. *Memory & Cognition*, *31*, 1036–1044.
- Gallo, D. A., Roediger, H. L. III, & McDermott, K. B. (2001). Associative false recognition occurs without strategic criterion shifts. *Psychonomic Bulletin and Review*, *8*, 579–586.
- Gardiner, J. M., & Richardson-Klavehn, A. (2000). Remembering and knowing. In E. Tulving & F. I. M. Craik (Eds.), *The Oxford handbook of memory* (pp. 229–244). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Goodwin, K. A., Meissner, C. A., & Ericsson, K. A. (2001). Toward a model of false recall: Experimental manipulations of encoding context and the collection of verbal reports. *Memory & Cognition*, *29*, 806–819.
- Hicks, J. L., & Marsh, R. L. (1999). Attempts to reduce the incidence of false recall with source monitoring. *Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, & Cognition*, *25*, 1195–1209.
- Jacoby, L. L., Kelley, C. M., & Dywan, J. (1989). Memory attributions. In H. L. Roediger & F. I. M. Craik (Eds.), *Varieties of memory and consciousness: Essays in honor of Endel Tulving* (pp. 391–422). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Inc.
- Johnson, M. K., Hashtroudi, S., & Lindsay, D. S. (1993). Source monitoring. *Psychological Bulletin*, *114*, 3–28.
- Kirkpatrick, E. A. (1894). An experimental study of memory. *Psychological Review*, *1*, 602–609.
- Mather, M., Herkel, L. A., & Johnson, M. K. (1997). Evaluating characteristics of

- false memories: Remember/know judgements and memory characteristics questionnaire compared. *Memory & Cognition*, 25, 826–837.
- McDermott, K. B. (1997). Priming on perceptual implicit memory tests can be achieved through presentation of associates. *Psychonomic Bulletin and Review*, 4, 582–586.
- McDermott, K. B., & Watson, J. M. (2001). The rise and fall of false recall: The impact of presentation duration. *Journal of Memory and Language*, 45, 160–176.
- Miller, M. B., & Wolford, G. L. (1999). Theoretical commentary: The role of criterion shift in false memory. *Psychological Review*, 106, 398–405.
- Neuschatz, J. S., Payne, D. G., Lampinen, J. M., & Tolia, M. P. (2001). Assessing the effectiveness of warnings and the phenomenological characteristics of false memories. *Memory*, 9, 53–71.
- Robinson, K. J., & Roediger, H. L. III (1997). Associative processes in false recall and false recognition. *Psychological Science*, 8, 231–237.
- Roediger, H. L. III, Balota, D. A., & Watson, J. M. (2001). Spreading activation and the arousal of false memories. In H. L. Roediger, J. S. Nairne, I. Neath, & A. M. Suprenant (Eds.), *The nature of remembering: Essays in honor of Robert G. Crowder* (pp. 95–115). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association Press.
- Roediger, H. L. III, & McDermott, K. B. (1995). Creating false memories: Remembering words not presented in lists. *Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition*, 21, 803–814.
- Roediger, H. L. III, & McDermott, K. B. (2000a). Distortions of memory. In E. Tulving & F. I. M. Craik (Eds.), *The Oxford handbook of memory* (pp. 149–162). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Roediger, H. L. III, & McDermott, K. B. (2000b). Tricks of memory. *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, 9, 123–127.
- Roediger, H. L. III, McDermott, K. B., & Robinson, K. J. (1998). The role of associative processes in creating false memories. In M. A. Conway, S. E. Gathercole, & C. Cornoldi (Eds.), *Theories of memory II* (pp. 187–245). Hove, UK: Psychology Press.
- Roediger, H. L. III, Watson, J. M., McDermott, K. B., & Gallo, D. A. (2001). Factors that determine false recall: A multiple regression analysis. *Psychonomic Bulletin and Review*, 8, 385–407.
- Schacter, D. L., Israel, L., & Racine, C. (1999). Suppressing false recognition in younger and older adults: The distinctiveness heuristic. *Journal of Memory and Language*, 40, 1–24.
- Schacter, D. L., Norman, K. A., & Koutstall, W. (1998). The cognitive neuroscience of constructive memory. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 49, 289–318.
- Schacter, D. L., Verfaellie, M., Anes, M. D., & Racine, C. (1998). When true recognition suppresses false recognition: Evidence from amnesic patients. *Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience*, 10, 668–679.
- Seamon, J. G., Luo, C. R., & Gallo, D. A. (1998). Creating false memories of words with or without recognition of list items: Evidence for nonconscious processes. *Psychological Science*, 9, 20–26.
- Stadler, M. A., Roediger, H. L. III, & McDermott, K. B. (1999). Norms for word lists that create false memories. *Memory & Cognition*, 27, 494–500.
- Tolia, M. P., Neuschatz, J. S., & Goodwin, K. A. (1999). Recall accuracy and illusory memories: When more is less. *Memory*, 7, 233–256.

- Tulving, E. (1985). Memory and consciousness. *Canadian Psychology, 26*, 1–12.
- Underwood, B. J. (1965). False recognition produced by implicit verbal responses. *Journal of Experimental Psychology, 70*, 122–129.
- Winograd, E., Peluso, J. P., & Glover, T. A. (1998). Individual differences in susceptibility to memory illusions. *Applied Cognitive Psychology, 12*, S5–S27.